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Introduction 
Acquisition efforts are under increasing pressure to deliver systems rapidly and at 
lower cost while providing enhanced performance capability. This is happening in an 
environment where research and development budgets are decreasing across the 
Department of Defense (DoD), the acquisition workforce is rebuilding, and the DoD is 
looking to rebalance warfighting portfolios. This has been compounded by an extremely 
dynamic environment of fiscal change and uncertainty imposed by significant budget cuts 
and sequestration impacts in the recent past.  
The overall trend of DoD budgets has been declining. The president’s fiscal year 
(FY) 2015 budget recognizes the fiscal imperative of deficit reduction, reducing projected 
defense budgets by about $113 billion over five years compared to levels requested in the 
FY2014 budget (DoD, 2014). As a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the DoD 
budget has been declining from approximately 15% in the mid-1950s to around 3% today. 
The growth in the DoD’s costs under the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projection of 
the base budget is somewhat less than the CBO’s (2014) projection of the growth of the 
U.S. economy, decreasing slowly from 2.8% of GDP in 2015 to 2.5% in 2025, and 2.3% in 
2030.  
One outcome of the fiscal pressures has been an increase in defense acquisition 
efforts that are focused on the rapid development and fielding of an integrated system of 
systems (SoS) capability. Many of these SoS leverage mature systems and sub-systems as 
“constituent” systems but do not contract directly with industry to deliver the integrated 
capability. Elements of the DoD acquisition workforce are therefore taking on increasingly 
technical roles and responsibilities as the lead integrators for complex SoS. It should also be 
noted that the acquisition workforce (AWF) has declined by more than 50% since the 1990s, 
while the value of Department of the Navy (DoN) contracting has increased by more than 
50%. With these significant AWF losses and attendant workload increases, the DoN 
recognized the loss in ability to manage the technical-cost tradespace it is responsible to 
execute, including major weapons systems acquisition (DoN, 2010). While the DoN AWF 
has grown by more than 20% (DoN, 2015) since 2010, some program managers are still 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 387 - 
challenged with staffing and resourcing an acquisition workforce with the technical depth to 
assume the increasingly technical roles associated with the development and fielding of an 
inherently government SoS capability. In many cases, the Naval Warfare Center and 
Systems Center’s engineering workforce is tasked to supplement the acquisition workforce 
with technical subject matter expertise in systems engineering, rapid prototyping, 
development and integration, test and evaluation, operations analysis, and other inherently 
government roles.  
Several novel systems engineering tools and methodologies have been developed to 
support the lead SoS engineer (LSoSE) with assessing system performance, system 
readiness, and risk through incremental development of a complex SoS. This paper will 
review the systems engineering processes and required level of technical rigor to manage 
the development and integration of a complex SoS in a distributed environment. A specific 
implementation of a Kill Chain framework that was designed to provide the PM and LSoSEs 
with comprehensive insight into the technical status and major risks for a complex SoS 
across specific mission threads will be presented. This paper will also review some of the 
systems engineering tools and methodologies developed and implemented by the Littoral 
Combat Ships (LCS) Mission Modules (MM) Program Office (PMS 420) that support the 
LCS MM Kill Chain framework. 
LCS Program Overview and Background  
Acquisition Strategy 
The Flight Zero Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) was approved in April 2004 and established the requirements of the LCS and 
three “focused” missions. Each Mission Package (MP) provides warfighting capability for 
one of three focused mission areas: 
 Mine Countermeasures (MCM)—Detection and neutralization of mine threats 
 Surface Warfare (SUW)—Maritime security missions and fleet protection from 
small boats and other asymmetric threats 
 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)—Countering shallow water diesel submarine 
threats 
The CDD was updated in 2008 to the current Flight 0+ version which included 
several requirement updates, which were used to drive the design for the full “production” 
versions of the seaframe and MPs. MP specific requirement updates included the Net 
Ready Key Performance Parameter (KPP), Material Availability KPP, and others. 
In 2003, the LCS MM Program Office (PMS 420) was established as part of the 
Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Littoral and Mine Warfare (LMW). PMS 420’s 
responsibilities originally involved end-to-end LCS MP development and lifecycle support. In 
2011, PEO LCS was established to align several program offices into one consolidated PEO 
focused entirely on delivering the LCS Program. This included the establishment of PMS 
505 to assume the responsibility for Fleet Introduction and Sustainment of Mission Modules 
and the seaframes. PMS 420 continues to rely heavily on Participating Acquisition Resource 
Managers (PARMs) to deliver mission systems to meet LCS MP specific requirements and 
is effectively the lead SoS integrator of this complex system of manned and unmanned 
systems. Examples of PARM systems include manned helicopters, sensor systems, 
weapons systems, and unmanned aerial, surface, and sub-surface vehicles. In some cases 
where commercial or government technology solutions cannot be identified, PMS 420 works 
with the naval science and technology (S&T) community to conduct accelerated 
development of non-POR technologies.  
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The LCS MMs are being developed and delivered using a rapid fielding approach 
where initial increments are fielded as the PARM technology matures and is integrated into 
useful elements of capability. Key to enabling this incremental development has been the 
definition and configuration management of standard interfaces between the seaframe and 
the MPs, as defined in the Interface Control Document (ICD) for the LCS. This approach 
allows the seaframes and MMs to mature independent of each other’s development and 
facilitates reconfiguration of the LCS seaframe and incremental upgrade of the modular MPs 
over their life cycle. This independence of interfaces, which are managed by the common 
ICD, allows both programs to develop and test against their unique KPPs, key system 
attributes (KSAs), and milestones. This effectively enables the MP incremental fielding 
approach. Useful increments of capability are fielded, which build upon the initial 
capabilities, ultimately satisfying the full KPP requirements with the final increment. The 
incremental approach to delivering fleet capability also allows continued capability insertion 
throughout the life of the program. Capability Production Documents (CPDs) are developed 
to describe the capabilities required to meet the production baseline for a specific increment 
and also provide a testable requirement for the test community. 
The LCS MM acquisition strategy leverages an organic Navy workforce, which 
provided flexibility to accommodate requirements refinement as the initial MP capability 
matured. This effectively reduced the Navy’s exposure to cost and contract risk with industry 
throughout the early prototyping phases. The various lead SoSEs are aligned to their 
respective chartered mission areas as shown in Figure 1 (i.e., Naval Surface Naval Surface 
Warfare Center [NSWC] Panama City Division is the LSoSE for the MCM MP, NSWC 
Dahlgren Division is the LSoSE for the SUW MP, Naval Undersea Warfare Center [NUWC] 
Newport Division is the LSoSE for the ASW MP, while SPAWAR Systems Center [SSC] 




In a departure from the traditional prime integrator role, industry supports the LCS 
MM program as the Mission Package Integrator (MPI) to perform production, packaging, and 
assembly (PP&A) functions. The MPI role is limited and focuses on productionizing systems 
and equipment once a useful capability has been demonstrated. The various Naval Warfare 
and Systems Centers continue to assume primary responsibility of developing and 
integrating the initial MP increments through initial testing, fieldings, and early deployments 
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as the LSoSE. The LCS MM acquisition workforce has also been supplemented significantly 
with functional area subject matter expertise as available from the various Navy Warfare and 
Systems Centers to provide cross MP support in areas which include, but are not limited to 
the following: System Safety, Environmental Safety and Occupational Health, Information 
Assurance/Cybersecurity, Configuration Management, Human Systems Integration, 
Corrosion Control, and so forth. 
LCS Mission Package and Open Architecture 
The LCS MMs program was founded on the principles of incremental acquisition, 
open system architecture, and an open business model. As previously discussed, 
incremental acquisition promotes fielding of needed capabilities as they become available. 
Standard interfaces and an open business model enable more rapid integration of PARM 
and other systems as they mature. The LCS MM reference architecture is shown in Figure 
2. It is a high-level, system-agnostic block diagram that articulates functional as well as 
business dimensions. It is not intended to be the primary design tool, but is used by the lead 
SoSE and Program Manager (PM) to easily communicate SoS boundaries and interfaces 
with internal and external stakeholders, the S&T community, and other stakeholders. 
Additionally, it is used as the basis to establish boundaries for configuration management 
and certification events.  
“Focused” warfare MPs are designed to be installed on an LCS one mission at a time 
with the LCS Combat System providing the MPs with access to the seaframe hosted 
information technology (IT) infrastructure, sensors, weapons, countermeasures, and 
communications reachback through Exterior Communications (EXCOMMS). Functionality 
provided by the MP Combat System includes, but is not limited to computing, 
communications, mission planning, execution, and post-mission analysis. MP manned and 
unmanned vehicles may be augmented with specific weapons, and/or sensors, and/or 
countermeasures to execute a focused mission. The level of detail of the reference 
architecture does not allow for the arrows to depict the specific data path, but implies 
connectivity at the end points. 
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Requirements, Architecture, and Interface Models  
Orchestrating the development of a complex SoS requires clear communication and 
organization of requirements in ways that clearly derive and allocate requirements as well as 
define boundaries between where responsibility lies and where negotiation may be required 
between program offices, Systems Commands, or other stakeholders. The LCS MM specific 
example is further challenged by the need to manage multiple increments at varying levels 
of maturity and cost targets which drove concerted efforts to identify common services, 
hardware, and systems.  
This requires a robust and disciplined SoSE activity to first decompose the high-level 
requirements communicated in the CDD and CPDs, and to then perform the detailed 
analysis required to support the technical and cost trades needed to ensure that the 
architecture, requirements, and interfaces are developed and maintained at a sufficient level 
of detail to ensure the development of a capable and cost effective SoS capability. A cross-
MP Systems Engineering Integrated Product Team (SEIPT) was established at the working 
level responsible for developing requirements, architectures, and the associated SE tools 
and processes required to support the development of complete, verifiable, and cost 
effective functional and allocated baselines for the MPs which dictate the development of 
the LCS MM SoS. As various increments proceed through the development, PARMs and 
other external stakeholders are engaged as required to ensure that requirements and 
interfaces are understood and managed effectively. A series of Technical Interchange 
Meetings (TIMs) are typically held as a specific increment proceeds toward a formal 
Systems Engineering Technical Review (SETR; i.e., Preliminary Design Review [PDR], 
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Critical Design Review [CDR], etc.). The LCS MM requirements framework was developed 
by the SEIPT and provides a hierarchical framework used to derive and allocate top-level 




Level 1 requirements are defined as program level requirements provided by 
external sources. Level 1a requirements are developed by the user through the Joint 
Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process. For example, the LCS Flight 
0+ CDD provides the required performance attributes for the initial MP Increments, and the 
Incremental CPDs provide the specific performance attributes in support of the incremental 
production and fielding of the MPs. Level 1b requirements define common external 
interfaces which are typically outside the span of PMS 420 or the LSoSE’s control. Level 2 
requirements are defined as the common requirements developed by the LSoSE. These 
“common” or Level 2 requirements are typically driven by open architecture, cost savings, or 
other acquisition-type objectives. Level 2a captures sets of like functional requirements 
which are common to more than one Mission Package (i.e., Safety, Information Assurance/ 
Cybersecurity, Environmental, Logistics, etc.). Level 2b defines Systems and sub-systems 
which are common to more than one MP (i.e., computing infrastructure, communications, 
sustainment, etc.). The MP requirements are defined at Level 3 and typically include the 
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test. Mission Module requirements and intra-MM interfaces are typically defined at Level 4. 
Capabilities common to more than one MM within a specific MP, such as the MP Application 
Software (MPAS), are implemented at Level 4. Mission System requirements and interfaces 
are defined at Level 5. Interfaces which the LSoSE must retain control over to ensure 
capability or modularity objectives are documented in PMS 420 controlled Interface 
Requirement Specifications (IRSs) or ICDs. 
The respective warfare focused MP technical teams manage the interfaces within an 
MM or MP by defining the details of the interfaces in the requirements and architecture 
products. Internal MP interfaces are documented within the standard section of the 
System/Sub-System Specification (SSS) and flowed down to Sub-system Specification (SS) 
and other documents. To control parallel development among the various MPs or external 
stakeholders, PMS 420 defines and controls common services and interfaces via 
standalone an IRS or an ICD/IDD depending on the level of control required. An IRS 
describes the functional requirements (e.g., data communication requirements) and an IDD 
or ICD describes the design details of the interface.  
Program offices responsible for constituent system development typically contract to 
a prime developer and find it sufficient to decompose the CDD into a System/Sub-System 
Specification (SSS) or an A-Spec, which is then put on contract. Due to the complex nature 
of the LCS MM SoS and the number of organizations involved in development of MMs, 
mission systems, sub-systems, and so forth, PMS 420 has found it necessary to manage its 
specification tree down to the MM level (or Level 4) with a strong understanding of how 
those MM requirements are allocated to individual Mission Systems. PMS 420 has 
historically formalized such technical agreements with its PARMs or other stakeholders 
through System Project Directives (SPDs), which are essentially Memorandums of 
Agreement between government program offices supplemented with SSS, Sub-System 
Specification (SS), ICDs, and architecture products as appropriate. Architecture products 
are typically developed through the MM and mission system Levels 4 and 5 in accordance 
with version 2.0 of the Defense Architecture Framework (DODAF) framework (DoN, 2011). 
Interfaces which require high levels of integration and/or are anticipated to be high risk are 
further detailed using high fidelity interface models using Systems Modeling Language 
(SysML). Interface requirements further derived through the use of DODAF and SysML are 
fed back, or synchronized, into the appropriate requirements specification documents. The 
SPDs appended with SSS, SS, and IRSs at Level 4 or below to inform contract actions with 
PARM contract actions. As most of the mission systems which are constituent to the SoS 
have their own ACAT designation, requirements, and funding lines, it is not until this level of 
analysis is performed that we can begin to understand the gaps between the prescribed 
SoS and mission system requirements. This synchronized requirements and architecture 
development process is depicted in Figure 4.  
The requirements derivation and supporting architecture development process 
requires collaboration across several organizations. PMS 420 utilizes a collaborative 
engineering environment such that its distributed user base can access the LCS MM 
DOORS modules from government and contractor facilities. In 2014, this capability was 
expanded to include access to the LCS MM System Architect encyclopedias. These 
DOORS and system architect instantiations are used mostly by the PMS 420 core SE IPT. 
In 2013, the Navy Systems Engineering Resource Center (NSERC) hosted Systems 
Engineering Integrated Data Environment (SE IDE) was redesigned to ensure internal and 
external users timely access to requirements, architectures, and technical data packages in 
support of formal reviews (i.e., SETRs, certification events, or other events as required).  
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Assessing Technical Performance Measures for a Complex SoS  
Technical Performance Measures (TPMs) are a time-based metric used to compare 
actual performance to projected performance as a system advances through various 
developmental and test events. The specific metrics are typically implemented at the system 
or sub-system level. The TPMs which have the greatest impact on SoS mission 
performance are specified in the SPD and supporting requirements documents. The PARMs 
are responsible to report any scheduled test results back to the LSoSE on a quarterly basis, 
or sooner via the integrated risk management, or other technical management process. The 
LSoSE is then challenged with understanding the impact of any performance shortfalls and 
then assessing the impact to SoS mission performance and presenting the impacts to 
leadership.  
The LCS MM program developed a framework to identify and track the TPMs which 
are critical for LCS mission success. Therefore, thoughtful selection, review, and tracking of 
TPMs are required to allow technical managers to make informed decisions during system 
design and to identify the need for corrective actions when deviations from planned 
technical progress occur. In cases of complex SoS with multiple variables, dependencies 
and/or mission execution paths, multiple TPMs inform a modeling and simulation (M&S) tool 
to project probable performance of the MSs and/or MMs associated with an MP. In some 
cases, the TPMs that PARMS are tracking for other missions are not critical to PMS 420 and 
therefore are not tracked by the LCS MM LSoSE.  
The allocation of KPPs to TPMs for a notional ASW MP is depicted in Figure 5. High 
fidelity, non-linear, complex M&S tools are usually required to predict the performance of the 
integrated MP based on the TPMs’ inputs of the constituent mission systems. For example, 
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the Naval Mine Warfare Simulation (NMWS) tool is an object-oriented, event-driven 
simulation tool traditionally used by the Navy’s Mine Warfare community. This SoS M&S tool 
is capable of reflecting the complexity of an SoS because it can accommodate multiple 
inputs, such as mission thread information, environmental predictions, mission system 
performance parameters, high-level reliability parameters, and critical task analysis inputs. 
PMS 420 has found the use of a Kill Chain based modeling methodology to provide benefit 
to program management and risk identification, and we will now discuss that process. 
 
 
Applying the Kill Chain Methodology to a Complex SoS  
Given a notional SoS with 12 constituent systems, each with six to eight TPMs, over 
100 TPMs can result. The LSoSE cannot always expect to present status on each TPM at 
TIMs, SETRs, certification events, or other decision meetings. To assist in managing this 
challenge, the Kill Chain methodology of a mission-based approach to assessing and 
visualizing how an SoS is expected to perform in the execution of a specific mission thread 
is used. It is intended to provide insight into any risks or issues associated for the individual 
systems, sub-systems, or interfaces in properly executing its allocated functionality. Several 
communities have developed specific implementations for various purposes. Perhaps the 
most pervasive are the operational test community’s Warfare Capability Baseline (WCB) 
process and larger Navy Integration and Interoperability (I&I) implementations (Clawson et 
al., 2015). The WCB approach in particular was developed with a focus on test data in 
preparation for an operational test event. LCS MM LSoSEs have expanded upon and 
tailored a Kill Chain implementation to compensate for the incremental, technical, and 
organizational complexities that can complicate the assessment and presentation for a 
complex SoS.  
As previously described, the LCS MM SoS is made up of various manned and 
unmanned vehicles, sensor systems, communication systems, weapons systems, and 
systems provided by the core LCS seaframe. As MPs are fielded incrementally, mission 
systems and/or capability upgrades are added to the MP baselines. Further, multiple sub-
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mission threads, or “passes,” with various permutations of these vehicles, sensors, and 
systems, can be required to accomplish missions with extended timelines, such as those 
required to clear a minefield. An example Kill Chain for a notional ASW MP is shown in 
Figure 6. The overarching Kill Chain assessment process is depicted in Figure 7. The Kill 
Chain is presented as a matrix of systems and sub-systems, laid against mission phases 
(i.e., Prepare/Configure, Search/Detect/Classify/Localize, Identify, Neutralize, Assess, Post 
Mission Analysis). Each system, sub-system, and integration point is assessed for its 
individual contribution associated and risk of meeting the mission specific requirements set 
using the LCS MM standard risk assessment criteria. In many cases, multiple TPMs are 
tracked and used to quantitatively assess the respective system or sub-system against its 
allocated contributions. Any system which misses a major TPM milestone cues a re-
evaluation of the Kill Chain for impact. If the performance degradation does not force a 
change to the risk rating, then the Kill Chain is not updated. The assessment method is also 
denoted to provide insight into the level of confidence in the assessment (i.e., S = SME 
estimate, M = Modeled result, T = Verified in test, F = Fielded System). A path key with 
varying thickness is used to assist the PM or LSoSE to understand where the specific 
system falls in the multi-pass sequence of events. Notes can be overlaid on the Kill Chain to 
reference the PM or LSoSE to specific risks or issues. In order to not lose the fidelity, Kill 
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Lessons Learned and Opportunities for Future Work 
This paper presented the systems engineering processes and level of technical rigor 
required to manage the development and integration of a complex SoS. A specific Kill Chain 
framework was presented, which is currently used to assess and visualize the impact of 
TPMs on a complex systems of manned and unmanned systems mission threads. As 
currently constructed, the Kill Chains provide the PM with comprehensive insight into the 
technical status and major risks and issues for a complex SoS across specific mission 
threads. Due to the various configurations that the LCS MM PMs and LSoSEs are 
responsible to track, the LCS MM program office has invested significant resources into 
coordinating several of the basic systems engineering methodologies and tools to support 
the Kill Chain process, namely requirements, architectures, and risk management.  
 Requirements were developed to a sufficient level of detail to articulate the 
specific contribution of the system, sub-system, and interface required at 
each phase in the mission thread.  
 Architectures were developed to the sufficient level of detail to ensure that the 
weapons critical path covers the sequence of events critical for mission 
success.  
 Constituent system requirements must be aligned to LCS MM requirements. 
In the cases when constituent systems have their own requirements sets 
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(CDDs, CPDs, or other), the LSoSE must work with both resource sponsors 
to identify and work to close significant requirements and/or interface 
misalignments.  
 Constituent system program managers must also be responsible to, and have 
a mechanism to report, TPMs to the LSoSE routinely.  
 Risk and issues are flagged at least to the level of detail (i.e., system, sub-
system, interface) presented in the Kill Chain.  
 The team responsible to develop MM requirements is distributed across at 
least four Naval Warfare and Systems centers. PMS 420 has developed a 
common access card (CAC)-enabled collaborative engineering environment 
where a distributed user base can access the LCS MM DOORS modules 
from government and contractor facilities. Change management and control 
processes were also developed. In 2014, this capability was expanded to 
include access to the LCS MM System Architect encyclopedias. 
To date, the Kill Chain framework has been extremely effective as LCS MM prepares 
for several operational test events. Performance issues are captured, assessed, and 
presented in the context of their impact to the overall mission success. In order to expand 
this approach to provide the PM with a more predictive tool that can be used for technology 
insertion planning and to better support the developmental phases of the next increments, 
some of the other technical management and systems engineering methodologies and tools 
must be appropriately configured. Integrating a robust modeling and simulation capability 
would better support analysis of alternative and technology insertion trade-off–type 
analyses. Integrating cost, schedule, and the -ilities, such as reliability, sustainability, and 
other models, would better support understanding the capability from a performance and 
total ownership cost (TOC) perspective. 
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